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live in, we must understand the dynamic forces that drive 
human behavior. We must examine, at the foundational level, 
the nature of man and the relation between his thought and 
his resulting action. Through close analysis of these causal 
building blocks of individual knowledge, we can understand 
why a person reacts to his environment in a particular 
fashion, and predict his responses to different kinds of 
external stimuli. Many philosophers--theological, social, and 
political--have attempted through the years to make these 
kinds of determinations regarding why man is what he is, and 
why he does what he does.
In his article, "The Impact of the Concept of Culture on 
the Concept of Man," Clifford Geertz claims that culture 
must be seen as much an affective agent in what man has 
developed into as a product of that development. Man did 
not, Geertz says, first develop into a prototypical physical 
standard of what we see today, and then proceed to "create" 
culture afterwards as a result of the new cerebral functions 
he possessed; rather, culture developed (and still develops) 
along with man's expanding knowledge and is as much a 
formative refining agent to that knowledge as the reverse
s
(Platt, 1965, p. 110). in this way, culture is an integral 
part of who man is, not only an external product.
Because culture cannot be separated from man, his 
knowledge, his impulse, his passion, culture is one root of 
the processes that ultimately serve to determine behavior. 
Geertz demonstrates that culture is a kind of symbolic, 
abstract knowledge within man, and that man mentally accesses 
this symbolic knowledge when formulating behavioral (mental, 
emotive, or mechanical) responses to differing stimuli. 
Culture, to an individual, is a symbolic road map to activity 
(Geertz, 1965, p. 107).
The concept of ideology is very closely related to 
Geertz's idea of culture. An ideology is a particular set of 
symbolic ideas in much the same way that culture is a set of 
abstracts. Both culture and ideology contain principles that 
guide individuals in their actions. They are overlapping, 
intertwining foundations of knowledge for an individual.
Steve Seitz defines an ideology as "thought rooted in a 
socio-historical context, an abstraction from human 
experience, a guide to social and political action" (Shaw, 
1973, p. 6).
Neither Geertz nor Seitz claim that any one individual 
has a complete cultural knowledge or ideology; knowledge must 
always be partial or flawed. Likewise neither claim that
7people always act out their cultural or ideological beliefs 
in a logical or non-contradictory manner. But because this 
symbolic knowledge is a large determinant of behavior, it is 
useful to examine in a practical context.
As political science and political philosophy are 
concerned in part with exploring causes of human behavior in 
the political realm, it will prove informative to look at the 
precepts of a modern political ideology and determine the 
human behaviors that these precepts guide when individuals 
in civil society access them in their symbolic form. How do 
these precepts give rise to certain types of consistent 
behavior? To where does the ideological system logically 
direct one’s thoughts? Do the individual and collective 
responses to the ideology match predictions made by authors 
of the ideology, or do aberrations occur? Most important for 
this essay, what happens when reality is not consistent with 
the functioning picture of the world an ideology provides? 
What reactions are produced as the result of this situation? 
The answers to these questions will provide an illustration 
of how ideology influences behavior, but more importantly for 
political science, will predict human responses when the 
principles of a particular ideology are challenged. The 
ideology which we shall examine for this study is one that 
has appeared relatively recently in world history, but has
8forever altered the face of civil society around the globe.
That ideology is Liberalism.
Sfifitiflu l ; ...EccfiQfiUlQnal inventory Qf.yj>erjilis®
The ideological precepts of Liberalism were first 
enunciated by European theorist John Locke a decade prior to 
the Glorious Revolution. Locke's political philosophy, 
presented in the Two Treatises of Qovermant, forwarded ideas 
for the bases of political power and the formation of civil 
society which had been completely ignored or.unheard of 
during his time. The radical nature of his writings set off 
waves of new political philosophy which are spreading and 
reverberating even today. In articulating the philosophy of 
Liberal society, Locke began an attack on several existing 
institutions of state power that would feel the brunt of his 
criticiains for many years. The political face of the world 
was altered forever by the publication of Locke's theories. 
What are the primary tenets of this philosophy that appeared 
as a new voice among established systems, that challenged the 
paternal order of rulership, that provided a set of 
principles that people could order their lives around? That 
is what we seek to answer as we examine an inventory of the 
precepts of Liberalism. The philosophy became ideology as 
people applied its principles and used the belief system as a 
whole to make their world more secure and understandable.
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The main purpose of Locke's first treatise was to 
discredit the theory that kings rule by divine right. He 
reviews the claims supporting the theory, and argues that 
they have no validity. Supporters of this "divine right" 
thought that in the same way parents have God-given authority 
over their children, kings have a "paternal" power over their 
subjects. Locke argues that parents only have a legitimate 
basis for authority over their offspring for the express 
purpose of "educating" them so that they may function in the 
world. He therefore says that when children have reached the 
age where they understand and appeal to Reason and need no 
further guidance from their parents to survive, paternal 
authority ceases. Thus, a king cannot have paternal 
authority over subjects; they are all grown up and have no 
need to consult him on questions of survival or living.
Locke destroys the legitimation of the divine right of kings 
by defining the origins of paternal authority in the needs of 
the offspring. Adult subjects of a king have no similar 
needs, Locke says.
This left political contemporaries of Locke's time with 
a gaping question. If political authority could not be 
somehow drawn from a scriptural reference employed as 
approval for monarchy, if it did not exist and reside in a
t!
king who must "father" his people, where or in whom was it to 
be found? What factor (or factors) then legitimized 
political power? Locke subsequently tackles these questions 
in his Second Treatise.
It is necessary upon starting out to define political 
power. Without a definition, Locke would be providing 
aimless proofs towards a nebulous goal. Locke provides us 
with his definition of political power in order that we may 
trace his reasoning from the foundation to the peak. And 
this is the Lockean definition of political power, the 
cornerstone of Liberal ideology: "the Right of making
laws...for the regulating and preserving of property... and in 
defense of the commonwealth from foreign injury, and all this 
only for the public good" (Locke, 1960, p. 308). Locke then 
shows how this definition of power may be arrived at through 
reason. He begins, as many political writers before him, by 
examining man in his natural state, and seeking to trace the 
development of civil society from naturally occurring factors 
of humanity.
Locke looked at man in the state of nature through 
glasses of a different color than the ones worn by political 
philosophers before him. They had often regarded the world 
as partitioned into two kinds of people; the philosopher and
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the vulgar of Benedictus de Spinoza provide a sufficient 
example of the division. Locke, however, departs from this 
sort of dichotomous model. He provided a clue to his view of 
the natural man while discrediting the theory of divine 
right. His refutation rests in part on the view that adults 
are able to appeal to their own Reason in the course of 
everyday living to solve problems. The king is in no way 
more intelligent, reasonable, pious, or less prone to 
mistakes than the average person. Locke expands this facet 
of his argument and clarifies it in his second treatise. He 
states that all men are provided naturally and at birth equal 
access to nature’s abundant provisions and to use of the same 
faculties of Reason. He places men on the same level 
mentally and, from the outset, on equal terms materially. 
Because of this equality, Locke derives that all men are born 
free. Since no man can claim superior access to Reason over 
another, neither can they appropriate for themselves an 
unequal proportion of power over another. These two 
principles, equality and freedom, form the core of Locke’s 
political theory, and affect the entire structure of his 
argument. More currently, they are familiar to us as the 
foundational points of America’s Liberal existence.
Locke's argument that men are free rests on his first
13
postulate that all men have the same faculties and use of 
Reason. Reason, he says, is the "law of nature," available 
to all, which directs how men ought to conduct themselves in 
the state of nature. Locke considers Reason so important, so 
fundamental, that he refers to it as "given from God." In 
the state of nature, men have only Reason to appeal to in 
decision making, because there exists between men no judge 
which is common to all or superior over all, who might settle 
their grievances. Fortunately, though, "Reason, the Law of 
Nature, teaches that none ought to harm another in life, 
health, liberty, or possessions" (Locke, i960, p. 311). 
Without this law accessible to all men, Locke's description 
of the state of nature might more closely resemble Hobbes'-- 
more brutal, violent, and deadly.
Why, then, is it necessary for men to enter into civil 
society? While Reason is commonly available to men, problems 
occur when men refuse to use this wisdom given them. Locke 
remarks that men "biased by their interest as well as 
ignorant [of Reason] for want of study of it, are not apt to 
allow of it as binding to them in the application of it to 
their particular case" (1960, p. 396). This fact necessitates 
civil society. Man's penchant for fallibility requires him 
to establish a structure which allows him to carry on life
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protected from the passions and errors of himself and others. 
In order for this to occur Locke prescribes a law common to 
all men, whether they be citizens or executives of society. 
This law must not have exceptions or show favoritism in 
regard to its executors; this would be quite contrary to the 
idea that men are each others' equals, and might allow those 
with power to use it unjustly to their own favor. Locke is 
trying to eliminate just such evil with his political theory. 
From Locke's description of such a common law springs the 
Liberal tenet of government that men should be governed 
equally under the law, and that their disputes must be 
settled by an impartial, unbiased observer of the law. The 
United States is referred to as a "democracy" under general 
terms; actually "republic" provides a truer label: civil 
society by the rule of law, a principle in accordance with 
Locke.
The reason that Locke takes such pains in delineating 
exactly who man is in the state of nature, and likewise, the 
reason that description is so essential to our understanding 
of Liberalism today is that the state of nature can never be 
entirely separated from the conception of civil society. The 
characteristics of man in the state of nature still remain 
inseparable from him in society, and the Reason which governs
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him naturally is facilitated to govern him more completely in 
society. In this sense civil society is not an alteration of 
the state of nature, but and extension of it, with certain 
advantages accruing. An example of a situation which 
illustrates the presence of the state of nature within 
society: the hypothetical meeting of two men on the highway,
far removed from any common judge or executors of the law 
which governs them. While these men are under the law of the 
civil government at this time the law and government are 
helpless to exercise authority as a common judge; there is no 
ability to see that the law is enforced. At this point in 
time the men are for all intents and purposes relating to 
each other within the state of nature.
This is one sense in which the state of nature exists 
within society; another is in the way that the defining 
principles of man in the state of nature do not change when 
he enters civil society. The fact that all men are equals is 
not altered within society. The fact that all men have 
access to the same Reason is not altered within society. The 
precept that all men must be free from arbitrary rule by 
another is not altered within society. These postulates are 
unalterable no matter what state man is in. They are the 
consistent, unchanging root of Liberalism, discovered in the
16
state of nature, but true everywhere. Locke's civil society 
does not seek to alter who man is, but only to avert the 
disaster of his mistakes.
We must step back from scrutinizing the characteristics 
of man for a moment. We have defined, in part, what man is, 
but that does not necessarily tell us what he does. Without 
that knowledge, it is useless to discuss the forces that 
drive him or his relationships with others, because we have 
no idea where these are leading him. Locke says that man is 
primarily motivated (or perhaps driven) by his desire for 
self-preservation, a desire given by God through Reason.
This is both an individual and collective goal of mankind. It 
directs his actions, makes it imperative for him to abide by 
the law of nature, and necessitates some sort of social 
functioning with others. Locke's description of the 
characteristics of man enable us to discover the sphere in 
which he must work while achieving this goal. If equality is 
the fundamental characteristic of man, preservation is the 
fundamental goal. This also holds true whether man exists in 
a state of nature or civil society. It is this goal, in 
fact, that causes man to form civil society; his Reason 
dictates that it may best be achieved through that formation.
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In order to preserve himself, man must have sustenance 
and shelter. In the original state of nature, acquiring 
these was not difficult because of the abundance of necessary 
materials. The materials were so plentiful that they were of 
little value in and of themselves. Locke says that they only 
became valuable when a person had need of them and applied 
his hand in gathering them or using them. Such a person was 
not harming others in this way because of the plenty and 
availability of goods. His labor had value which made his 
goods valuable, although left in nature they were worthless. 
No other person was entitled to take away the goods that a 
person had labored to provide himself with; they were 
valuable because of the labor involved in gathering them from 
nature--and labor, Locke says, must be the sole property of 
the person who works. No other could be said to own a man’s 
labor. This would involve forcing another to act, which is 
prohibited by Reason because equals cannot arbitrarily demand 
action of each other. If one person controls another, a 
state of inequality results. Therefore, since a man cannot 
be said to ’own” another’s labor, he cannot either own that 
which another’s labor has given value to. This leads to the 
definition of property. Locke describes two kinds of natural 
property: a man’s person (his life, thoughts, etc.), and his
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labor. From application of these comes the definition of 
derived property: material goods which he has labored for.
To the three of these kinds of property, no other person is 
entitled. Liberalism champions these principles in every 
sense. People are entitled to the inalienable rights of 
"life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" (property 
certainly implied) because of the equality given them by 
their Creator and their labor for self-preservation.
These principles of property appeared within the state 
of nature. In today’s world of many billions of people, 
however, the resources for every person's self-preservation 
are not available in overabundance. Man was and is required 
to solve this problem of shortage, Locke says, because if he 
does not he will cease to exist. Man's desire for self- 
preservation is always foremost in his mind. Man met this 
challenge with the innovative processes of agriculture. 
Growing techniques allow a person to produce enough 
sustenance for himself plus a large surplus which may be 
provided to others. Thus, a person who owns little farmable 
land because of its scarcity may still benefit from others' 
ability to produce. The normal consequences of shortage are 
circumvented in this way by agriculture.
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But a problem develops because individuals do not have 
an incentive to grow more than they may need for themselves 
or their family. Besides, their surplus may spoil, unused, 
and they would lose the value of all the labor that went into 
creating that surplus. Locke describes the development of 
money as a process that enabled man to receive non-perishable 
goods in exchange for his perishable surplus that others 
need. These non-perishable goods--in the form of scarce 
metals--could be then re-applied towards the development of 
more surplus usable by others. The producer could also use a 
portion to reward himself with comforts and conveniences. In 
this way a person could gain wealth justifiably because of 
the benefit of his surplus to other people. And by storing 
up precious metals, he is not robbing others of provisions 
necessary for survival, but helping to produce more of them.
Locke saw that among men there exists varying levels of 
"industry," or the will to labor. Money becomes an incentive 
to a person to work so that he increases benefit to others in 
conjunction with benefits to himself. People though, 
according to their nature, apply themselves in varying 
degrees to labor, and Locke showed how they would be rewarded 
in accordance with their labor. This justifies the 
inequality of possessions, because those who labor hardest
20
will earn for themselves more benefit than those who labor 
very little (Strauss, 1972, p. 468) . Their advantage 
materially is permissible, though, because their produced 
surplus--which helps preserve others--also increases with 
their personal gain. This idea remains a principle aspect of 
Liberalism.
We have already discussed the idea that disputes occur 
between men in the state of nature because either they are 
ignorant of what Reason teaches, or because their personal 
passions keep them from obeying Reason. The inequality of 
possession* which Locke has now justified causes a great 
exacerbation to this problem. Some men, having little 
because they do not apply much labor, will undoubtedly be led 
by their "covetousness" to question another’s right to great 
possession. While Reason teaches that he should search out a 
means by which to produce more for himself and society and 
apply himself wholeheartedly to it, he is blinded by his 
passion for comfort. In this case, disputes between men 
about ideas and possessions abound, with no law or judge 
common to both to resolve the conflicts peaceably and justly 
as Reason dictates. They must turn to the formation of a 
civil society which will afford them protection of their 
persons and their property. The government of this society
21
must also encourage "industry" so that the collective 
preservation of mankind may be better accomplished. Reason 
dictates that man embark on this course of civil society, for 
protection and freedom from others’ non-Reasoned passions. 
Locke postulates, "The chief end of men uniting into 
commonwealths and putting themselves under government is the 
preservation of their property [life, liberty, and 
possessions]" (i960, p. 395).
Thus, Locke has described the nature of property, as 
related to the nature of man. The question that we must 
subsequently ask then, is, how does the nature of property 
affect formation of actual government policy? Locke has 
stated that the general goal of government is to protect the 
property of individuals, but it will be informative for us to 
examine the structure of current Liberal government today and 
see in specific fashion how this goal is being accomplished.
One very direct example of the effect of the nature of 
property upon government is found within the Constitution of 
the United States. The Liberal government of the US is often 
referred to as a "limited" government. This means that while 
it does reserve some areas of complete sovereignty over its 
citizens, there are also bounded areas of individual 
sovereignty where it cannot interfere. The reason the
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government has been established this way is two-fold: an 
unlimited government would ultimately place tyrannical power 
in the hands of governmental leaders even if their authority 
had, at first, been given them by the people; and an 
unlimited government would violate not only the rights of 
individuals to be secure in their own persons, but also in 
their possessions, to borrow some Constitutional language. 
Individuals are specifically granted the right to the 
security of their possessions in the Constitution because 
according to Liberal ideology every man's pursuit of the 
increase of personal possessions benefits all of mankind.
This translates into a "hands-off” or laissez-faire 
approach by the government in most matters regarding personal 
or corporate properties. The government keeps its hands out 
of profit-making ventures because Liberal ideology dictates 
that people will be best motivated by pursuance of their own 
best interest--and they will recognize their best interest 
through the Reason available to them. This in turn results 
in efficient production of resources helpful to mankind in 
common, while each individual pursues their own security and 
prosperity. People work hardest, Locke implies, when they 
are working wholeheartedly for themselves. The Liberal 
policy of limited government takes this "self-centeredness"
23
and allows it to produce benefits for the common good, as 
opposed to authoritarian governments which Locke criticizes 
because they assume planning of all production and then rape 
the producers of the benefits.
Another reason that Liberalism promotes the idea of 
limited government is that centrally planned governments tend 
to reduce worker initiative to be efficient and innovative. 
Laborers will only work as hard as they are forced because 
they realize most of what they produce and earn will be taken 
from them and used by the authorities to bolster their own 
positions or the safety of the state which secures their 
positions. Factories will turn out goods of poor quality 
because they are interested only in rushing to meet a state- 
specified quota so that they will not be punished.
Innovations in production will not be voluntarily made 
because that involves risking a certain amount of capital-* 
and for what? Workers will only receive the same benefit by 
reaching their quota, but if the innovation fails, they will 
be reprimanded. There is no good reason, on a localized 
scale, to risk that for the sake of innovation. The 
recently failed Soviet economy provides a good illustration 
of the problems resulting from centrally planned policies.
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Everyone is hurt by that type of system. An economy 
that puts together second-rate products and discourages 
innovation cannot ultimately provide for the security and 
prosperity of its citizens or the safety of its borders. 
Liberal, limited governments seek to avoid those pitfalls by 
allowing individual initiative to be the driving force behind 
production. Workers are allowed to experience the fruits of 
their labor rather than having it governed away. This 
provides the motivation for future work to be undertaken. 
Innovative risks are explored as individuals seek to profit 
more from their endeavors. This in turn provides chances for 
benefit to individuals outside of the original corporate 
structure.
To be sure, Liberal governments like the United States 
have discovered through experience that the "free-market" 
does require some regulation. And no government can survive 
without some means of collecting income through taxes. One 
needs only to remember the failed ability of the government 
to administrate under the Articles of Confederation. The idea 
behind limited government is that enough can be gleaned from 
individuals for administrative functions--that make citizens' 
lives better--while leaving them the largest proportion of 
their earned income to provide incentive.
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That is the reason that tax monies in Liberal systems 
like that of the US are not largely redistributed in order to 
bring all citizens towards a median standard of living. To 
do so would be to discourage those who, by their industry, 
have the potential to produce comparatively greater benefits 
for themselves and consequently for everybody. Tax laws in 
the US also allow for exemptions when money is used in 
investment-for-profit. This is an acknowledgment by the 
government of the Liberal principle that the more people 
invest in their own gain, the more they invest in everyone’s 
favor. These systems of limited government and of tax 
collection and expenditure illustrate how Liberal governments 
apply the theory of the nature of property in practice.
Formation of government must follow certain guidelines, 
however, so as not to contradict any principle of equality, 
freedom, or self-preservation as all citizens pursue property 
gain. Locke handles the arising issues by prescribing a 
government formed by "compact, with all consenting” to its 
powers and limits. This can be the only legitimate form of 
power. If some should structure the government so that it 
gives them personal advantage over others or subjugates 
others, then a situation is created in which there is 
inequality and ownership of another’s labor and unjust force.
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This is unacceptable and contrary to all Locke has shown up 
to this point. The government formed by equal consent of all 
participants in society must have the power to punish those 
who would offend the principles of equality or justice or 
preservation. Otherwise, it is helpless to preserve man, 
which is its main goal.
It must be noted that personal power of the participants 
or citizens under government can never be wholly surrendered 
up, or there would be no defense against encroachment on a 
person’s right to preserve himself. As a corollary, no power 
can be given by the government to any individual or group 
that would cause or allow the society's destruction. This 
would also be contrary to preservation, the reason for which 
government is formed. The decisions of the government can 
neither be made by authority of an individual or minority 
group unless they are conducted with the express consent of 
the majority of people and/or conducive to the common good. 
For any minority party to make decisions contrary to the 
majority will--what Locke terms "the greater force” of 
society--would b j to destroy the principle of equality. The 
majority may however give its consent to rule by a minority 
party through varying forms of government.
Locke advises on this point that a separation of 
governmental powers would be prudent. Otherwise, ”it may be 
too great a temptation to human frailty, apt to grasp at 
power, for the same persons who have the power of making laws 
to have also in their hands the power to execute them” (1960, 
p. 410). A separation of powers guards against an attempt by 
a governing party to exert their will unjustly over others or 
the majority. Liberal societies have honored this principle 
of separation of powers time and again. It has proven an 
adequate protection against usurpation.
In every facet, Liberal theory protects the equality and 
freedom of people. Under a Liberal system of government, 
people are freed to pursue their highest and common goal, 
self-preservation. Freedom enables fulfillment of this goal 
and is multiplied, not limited, by common laws. People of 
Liberal societies have freedom from arbitrary rule or 
subjugation by another, and freedom for personal security and 
gain in life. Locke wrote that a recourse to law in disputes 
is the greatest asset man can have in pursuing his goals.
When a government diverts from the goal of preserving society 
and subsequently its citizens, it has shown itself to be 
contrary to Reason. It is ruling by arbitrary power, and
thus has effectively dissolved itself, freeing the people to 
form another.
These principles of Liberalism fueled the fire of 
revolutions against such governments and a broader conceptual 
revolution for equality and freedom. They are powerful, 
innovative, proven principles that continue to be upheld the 
world over. But what happens when Liberalism is faced with a 
set of circumstances contrary to how it says the world should 
function? How does Liberalism stand up to pointed 
philosophical attack? Are there results which Locke did not 
or could not forsee? This is the question we seek to answer 
in the following section: How has Liberalism dealt with
several challenges committed to its destruction?
We have discussed Liberalism as a political ideology, 
its fundamental precepts and goals. We have also noted that 
ideologies help people to organize a chaotic world along 
general lines of functionality, and serve as a set of beliefs 
that guide the actions of individuals, organizations, 
governments. A few examples were given, in the section that 
summarized the key propositions of Liberalism, of how the 
ideology has guided the establishment of government and 
governmental policies. There is, however, an important 
question regarding ideologies, and specifically the ideology 
of Liberalism, tha^ we have yet to explore. The question is 
important to examine because it will spring up somewhere in 
the life of just about every ideology that has ever been used 
or ever will be used by man to make sense out of a complex 
world. We must ask: what happens to an ideology--and what 
happens to Liberalism--when it is confronted by a set of 
circumstances which it failed to predict or anticipate? When 
a people has ordered their lives around general principles 
which they hold to be true and functional, what occurs when 
they climb out of bed one morning and realize that events 
happening around them are taking place completely outside the
Section 3: Challenges to Liberalism
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realm of--or contrary to--their ideological belief set? How 
will this people respond? Hhat will become of the ideology?
Ideologies# as we have said# are for many people# 
principles that explain the how, why, and what of mankind. 
They allow people to imagine motives, understand another’s 
position on political or social issues, or determine a 
logically consistent course of action in their personal 
lives. Because ideologies are employed in some form or 
another by most people over the course of their lives, it is 
no mean occurrence when an event springs up suddenly and 
shouts, ”My existence defies your ideology! Your ideology is 
not functional in the way you believed, and I am the proof." 
This can be particularly stressful when an entire group of 
people function according to a shared ideology. It is much 
easier for a person to believe in the truthfulness or 
pragmatism of his own ideology when others are joined with 
him, working from the same origins for the same goals.
Surely# the thought goes, if it is a view held by many, it 
must be correct. At least that is how we check our actions 
subconsciously. So. when a situation occurs that presents a 
challenge to an ideology# that shows the world (or in 
particular the "world" of the ideology) is not painted all 
over in a shade drawn from the same bucket, people are forced 
to fashion a response, an answer, an explanation. An
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ideology is too personalized and too internalized to be 
shrugged off. A serious examination begins, of the ideology, 
and of the challenger.
These reactions to questions about ideology can take 
three forms. In one instance, after a defeated struggle to 
make the disparate parts fit together, the ideology will be 
thrown on the junk heap and forgotten, only to be replaced by 
a new and different one. This is certainly one way to 
resolve a conflict that arises when events are not as an 
ideology says they should be. Another response would be to 
somehow refashion the existing ideas within the ideology in a 
way which makes room for the new situation without internal 
conflict. Sometimes this grafting of the new and the old is 
done in a form which perverts the logic of the original 
belief set just enough to make fit the new part. People do 
not easily or willingly condemn to meaninglessness that which 
has been a part of them for very long. To do so would injure 
the self respect. But sometimes even this restructuring is 
not possible. Sometimes events are such that they are 
diametrically opposed to some of the precepts of an ideology# 
and in order to preserve some, the contentious part is simply 
dropped from the rest. Most people wil choose a solution 
involving the latter two principles, because in retaining 
part of an ideology they hear whispered reassurances that
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they were not completely wrong, after all. Not too many 
folks like to admit they are completely wrong--and where 
ideology is concerned, they usually aren’t anyway.
Ideologies really offer understanding of the broadest kinds 
of issues.
In understanding Liberalism and ideologies in general, 
we must examine them at some points at which they were 
confronted by the challenges just discussed. For the purpose 
of examining Liberalism, there exist a variety of 
circumstances of this kind which would offer a good scope of 
inquiry, Two of the profoundest occurrences in American 
history--a country built mainly around the ideological 
precepts of Liberalism- provide an excellent framework from 
which to view the swirling dynamics of an ideology in crisis. 
The events and philosophies of the South during the Civil War 
period, and the policies of the New Deal era give us prime 
illustrations of what happens when Liberalism is confronted 
with opposing viewpoints or circumstances. These battles of 
principle and philosophy flesh out nicely the hypothesis of 
the three possible responses, given above.
To refer back to the image of people waking up some 
morning and discovering the world just was not how they had 
thought when they fell asleep the previous night, that is 
just what happened to America quite a few years before the
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start of the Civil War. America woke up from its grogginess, 
and must have exclaimed aloud, "We believe that individuals 
are equal and free. We have built our entire civil society 
around this concept of man. And yet, right here in America 
we are abiding the existence of a class of slave-laborers!
How can this be?" Northerner and Southerner alike opened 
their eyes to the realization. Of course, they were not so 
asleep as to have no inkling of the paradox facing them, and 
neither did they admit to its discovery in a single moment as 
a man jolted from slumber makes a discovery. Social ideas 
move through a populous in slow waves like tidewaters*-first 
advancing a little, then receding a bit, but all the while it 
progresses more than it recedes. But the analogy of the 
sleeper does give some sense of the feeling which gradually 
pervaded the entire populous of the country. Liberalism said 
that all men were born free into a state of equality, and 
that civil society was created to preserve those qualities in 
best possible form. But below the Mason-Dixon line, 
thousands of people were born into a state of bondage, 
considered less than worthy to eat at the table of the 
master. Those masters, too, were heralders of the Liberal 
ideology and in some way the champion products of its scheme. 
They had gained wealth and preeminence for themselves through 
the innovative establishments of private agricultural
plantations. They had responded to the incentives of the 
Liberal atmosphere and proved themselves "industrious.” Yet, 
their profits had not been massed by the efforts of other 
free capitalist apprentices learning Liberal market nuances. 
They had been extracted by forced labor from a people made 
subservient. Here, indeed, was a problem brewing for Liberal 
ideology--a source of fomenting aggravation that would have 
to be dealt with, it could not be ignored forever.
Both the North and the South would have to deal with 
this ideological inconsistency, and it is not surprising that 
they took divergent paths in doing so. The South was much 
more dependent on slave labor for agricultural production 
than the North was for industrial production. Slavery was 
deeply ingrained in Southern culture, in the Southern way of 
doing business and turning a profit. The North had no such 
economic reliance upon slavery for production. Thus the 
North came comparatively easily to the viewpoint that slavery 
was an injustice to human beings who should be, under the 
principles of Liberalism, free and equal. The South, fearing 
the change in production and power that abolition would 
bring, began to develop a defensiveness about the issue.
Under no circumstance did the South want to see the 
emancipated slave carry away with him the means of cheap 
agricultural production and subsequently large profits. The
35
personal and collective pride of the South was tied up in the 
spreading lawns and wide porches of the plantation. To use a 
Biblical phrase to describe the situation, "Where a man’s 
treasure is, there his heart will be also.” In other words, 
the Southern heart was enamored with the stateliness of the 
empires-in-miniature it had built. The South could not 
possibly desire to break its own heart--this was too much 
that the North asked. But supporting the whole structure was 
the African slave.
The South, in order to keep its treasure and preserve 
its heart, was forced to come up with answers to the problems 
posed by the Liberal ideology to the institution of slavery . 
They were, in effect, backed into a corner by a moral 
interrogator. At that point when they could retreat no 
further from the accusations and disparaging remarks made on 
their vocation, they had to turn and vociferously return the 
challenge. Once defensive, the South had to become 
offensive, to confront Liberalism, to show where and why it 
was void and non-applicable to their situation. This would 
be no easy task, especially considering that part of the 
reason for the South’s prosperity was the Liberalness of the 
agricultural market it grown on.
In this sense the South would have to oppose itself, one 
of the main point Louis Hartz brings up in his book, The
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Liberal Tradition in America. He says that again and again, 
the South comes up with philosophical arguments designed to 
refute some portion of the Liberal theory, but ends up 
slaying itself by returning again and again to the principles 
it tried to destroy. On Calhoun’s several reversals, he 
remarks,
The idea of state "sovereignty" shatters a 
meaningful American union, and yet he insists with 
the most anguished repetition that this alone can 
serve as a national "preservative". The idea of a 
fixed Southern minority and a fixed Northern 
majority amounts to civil war, and yet the scheme 
of the "concurrent majority" he builds upon it he 
describes in terms of compromise that are nothing 
short of idyllic (Hartz, 1955, p. 160).
In this way, the South betrayed true Liberal sentiments which 
still bubbled under the surface of its collective soul. It 
was indeed difficult for the Southerners to assail the 
freedom and conventions of a market system which had brought 
so much prosperity to them. Liberalism, outside of the blind 
spot of slavery, was woven throughout the Southern cloth.
uThe South attempted through various other means to 
circumvent the Liberal ideology with which they had existed 
for decades. They declared a "Great conservative reaction," 
in which they proclaimed that Locke's precepts for social 
freedom were wrong. Hartz illumines the holes in the logic 
of this approach when he points out that the Southerners 
really had no conservative tradition which they could turn 
back to. They had experienced the power of being "born 
equal," in the words of Toqueville, and in attempting to be 
"conservative" there was nothing in their experience except 
this Liberalism to conserve (Hartz, 1 9 5 5 , p. 1 5 1 ). In trying 
to adopt the philosophies of a feudal reaction, the South 
was attempting to replace one ideology with another that 
better fit their circumstance, and did not condemn them at 
the same time. Hartz treats this scheme of the South with 
the same disregard the North did, referring to it as "simple 
fraud. When we penetrate beneath the feudal and reactionary 
surface of the South, we do not find feudalism: we find 
slavery" (1955, p. 147).
These philosophic approaches that the South presented as 
a replacement for Liberal ideologies were, because of 
Southern history and "plantation capitalism," fraught with 
difficulties and inconsistencies that could not be overcome. 
Upon the realization of this fact, some in the South began to
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implement a new approach to solving the problems Liberalism 
was causing their production and profit system. If they 
could not beat Liberalism by exchanging their identity for a 
non-Liberal one, they would have to find a weakness within 
the ideology so that it could be turned back on itself and 
employed to set the South free to follow its own road. Here 
we see the South developing a solution to its conflict of 
conscience by attempting the remaking of Liberalism at some 
point where it may have practical weaknesses, in doing this, 
Southerners twisted the logical premises of Liberalism a bit, 
realigning some of the principles in order to make slavery 
become non-problematic. This is the second kind of an 
approach that was discussed previously. It offers the 
resolution of challenges posed to an ideology in a way that 
may lie slightly logically perverted.
Thin new line adopted by Calhoun and others in the South 
involved a two-faceted advance on Liberalism that was 
intended to reveal that American Liberalism was really not 
what it had seemed, and that it was unworkable without some 
further mechanisms to reduce tensions between some of its 
precepts. Calhoun took full advantage of two general 
principles of Liberalism that relate in a give-and-take 
manner; in some situations Liberalism produces outcomes 
determined through a majority-rule process, and in some it
as a ,a sa iaS; ■■ a;, .sfesaisK y.--.' afessaa ■ ■. a: - vaa... ^ a .
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dictates that individuals (and minorities by logical 
extension) through property rights and pursuance of personal 
goals leserve sovereignty in areas that the state cannot 
touch. At sane points! in the normal course of events of 
civil society, these two general areas necessarily overlap 
and cause conflict. An appropriate current example of this 
conflict may be found in the heated debate over abortion 
rights in America. The majority, Locke’s "greater force of 
society," has vested its powers of decision making in a court 
that could possibly decide that abortion must be limited in 
greater scope or that it must be made illegal. "Pro-choice" 
activists contend that abortion regulations are regulations 
applied solely on the body of the pregnant woman--an area 
declared beyond governmental control by Liberalism. 
Organizations like the Supreme Court, and other 
constitutional arrangements, were designed to carefully 
consider and decide questions that arise in this area of 
overlap between the two principles.
Calhoun, though, wanted to exploit this tension in favor 
of southern sovereignty. He came up with a scheme that he 
termed the "concurrent majority," which basically declared 
the states had the right to secede at any time according to 
principles of minority (individual) rights found in 
Liberalism. Hhat he pit together mas a confusing array of
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theoretical mechanisms which Hartz says "quickly unravels 
itself into separate individuals executing the law of nature 
for themselves" (1955, p. 162). Basically, Calhoun elevated 
what Hartz calls the "individualism" of people in Lockean 
system to the group level. When Calhoun’s theory is 
examined, what it amounts to is a proclamation of the right 
of minority groups--in this case the states--to disable the 
policy making process of the majority and even to disengage 
themselves totally from it. Hartz could not be more correct 
in his assessment then, that the theory of concurrent 
majority results in a return to Locke’s state of nature, 
which in turn supports the formation of Liberal government. 
And Calhoun somehow failed to realize was that the slaves 
themselves constituted a minority grouping by his definition. 
In that case, they reserved to themselves a veto on the 
South’s legal definition of them as property. In essence, 
Calhoun said that based on Liberalism as he saw it, the South 
as a minority group should not have to abide the mastery of 
the Northern majority. How then, we must ask, could the 
South retain its majority mastery over the slave? The 
serious instability of Calhoun’s position is made plain.
The only other way the South could assail Liberalism was 
to somehow show that the application of its principles did 
not produce the freedom and equality intended. In fact, the
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South would have to show that Liberal society actually kept 
its members trapped in a more disadvantageous arrangement 
than slavery. This would logically make slavery seem a 
better alternative to Liberalism, and this is exactly the 
portrayal the South attempted to make during one phase of the 
secessionist rebellion.
Freedom, the South said, was an illusion. What 
Liberalism and the free market actually produced was "wage- 
slavery.* Through tempting promises of freedom and equality, 
laborers in the industrialized North were drawn in and 
exploited as they sought dreams of prosperity and security 
they could never achieve, went the argument of the South.
Some went so far as to make dire predictions about the 
emergence of socialism in the North. Hartz calls this 
damning philosophy the "crusade against free society" (1955, 
p. 178-200). what was interesting and contradictory was that 
the South itself actually dreamed ol and recognized the need 
for industrialization. And the Northerners simply turned a 
deaf ear when the South accused them of treating their 
"enslaved" factory laborers worse than the plantation slaves. 
Nothing was more damaging to this Southern position, Hartz 
says, than the simple and "brute reality of economic freedom 
that prevailed above the Mason-Dixon line. Nobody in the 
North, whether rich or poor, considered themselves a slave to
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capitalist masters. These were products of a desperate 
Southern imagination, and the North didn’t buy it.
Liberalism had passed a crucial test.
We now move to a more current example of another way 
America has dealt with a serious challenge to the Liberal 
ideology it lived and breathed. Out of the three possible 
approaches to dealing with this sort of challenge, the South 
employed the first two in its quest to secede and retain 
slavery. We will refer to these for the sake of easy 
organization and reference as substitution and 
reconstitution, respectively. The third human response to a 
world that does not seem to fit ideological parameters is in 
one sense possibly the hardest to adopt, because it is 
somewhat dishonest. Borrowing a term from the psychology, we 
will label this third type of response repression. This 
generally involves the removal of certain parts of an 
ideology from the whole set for a temporary amount of time 
until the world once again is returned to a state in which 
the reality matches the complete ideology. An example of 
practically an entire nation involved in this process of 
repression is found in the response of America to the 
challenge of the Great Depression. The New Deal policies of 
Roosovelt presented a challenge to Liberalism as America knew
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it on a scale that perhaps had not been equaled since the 
confrontation with the South.
The New Deal can be described as a time when Liberalism, 
or at least part of it, went under cover. When Roosevelt 
announced the implementation of many New Deal policies, 
America was hopeful that it finally was putting its feet back 
on the road to recovery. But it was also aware that the plan 
for this recovery was in many ways opposed to the ideology 
which they had formerly lived by, and were now only just 
squeaking by on. But the economic hardship of the previous 
years had somewhat dulled America's sense of ideological 
narrow-mindedness. To be sure, Americans across the nation 
still firmly believed in the Lockean principles of freedom 
and equality. But when you are forced to live on a 
shoestring, not knowing where you will find money in the next 
month to feed your family and keep them clothed, you have to 
question the dynamics of the Liberal market that brought you 
to that point. Was the deflated economy the product of greed 
and risky ventures that went wrong? Or did the market fail 
because there was something inherently wrong with the system? 
Those were the questions many Americans were forced to ask 
themselves.
A discussion of the questions about the market system is 
not, however, where we find the real challenge to Liberalism
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arising. The challenges became apparent when it was 
announced that many of the programs that were being planned 
to lift America out of its smothering economic troubles 
involved the expansion of the powers of the state into areas 
which had previously been under individual control. The 
problem came when new systems of taxing, spending, and 
redistribution were announced. The problem appeared with the 
idea that the federal government would be establishing 
business organizations to do the nation’s functioning. But 
to a country that had come through some of its bleakest 
times, the problems would have to make a way for answers that 
worked. That is why repression occurred. When life is easy 
and comfortable, questions of ideology can be debated at 
leisure and with great fervor. But when belts are tight, 
ideology has to play second fiddle to the more pressing needs 
of survival.
And that is exactly what Liberalism did. There were a 
number of justifications for sending Liberalism to second 
chair, some valid and some that may be more properly termed 
rationalizations--those which soothed over the ideological 
conscience, one way that America reassured itself was 
through telling itself that the Hew Deal policies were 
radical innovations. They did this, Hartz says, rather than 
"leave Locke openly," and expose themselves to the full force
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of the socialist ideologies that were gathering some steam 
(1955, p. 262). By "leaving Locke," Hartz meant a verbal 
acknowledgment that the policies of the New Deal were 
breaking the cords of Liberalism. Roosevelt never chose to 
make this outright acknowledgment. This is one reason why we 
can be sure that repression was taking place in his mind and 
in the minds of other Americans. There can be no doubt that 
when the realm of state power is expanded, it is at the 
expense of the rights and freedoms (and pocketbooks) of 
individual citizens. This was they key trick for America to 
accomplish during the rebuilding period of the New Deal: to 
"extend the sphere of the state, but retain Locke" (Hartz, 
1955, p. 259). As we look back on post-New Deal history, we 
see that Locke was in every aspect retained. We are 
particularly reminded of this today by the country’s 
obsession with debating Lockean*-and Liberal --questions of 
state versus individual rights, of welfare programs, of 
national health insurance. Locke is alive and well in 
America today; he was only temporarily instructed to stay out 
of sight, to lie low. Problems are best worked out when a 
selective memory helps to remove questions of ideology from 
the solution set.
Another way in which America was able to deal with the 
shrinking of their sense of Lockean individualism during the
46
New Deal was to paint the programs of the era net only as 
innovations for solving a temporary problem, but also as 
actual pillars of support for the capitalist free-market that 
would soon get back to its feet (Hartz, 1955, p. 263). 
Certainly, for a time, the state might run its programs and 
spread its tax monies around, but it was all for a future day 
when the free-market would again distribute wealth and 
general prosperity according to a man's industry. Through 
this kind of thinking, the Liberal urgings of the nation's 
heart were put off until a day when Liberal policies would 
once again be vindicated.
There is another kind of challenge to Liberalism which 
we have not yet considered. This kind differs from the 
others in form. Whereas the previous two examples of an 
ideological confrontation occurred when the entire nation 
realized that the country's situation did not exactly match 
the Liberal belief set, this challenge is brought in a 
philosophic manner, presented by one person through a 
literary medium. Theodore Lowi's contention about Liberalism 
is that, even when a Liberal government is established 
according to the principles outlined by Locke, it does not 
function as a government should. He takes the precepts in 
Liberalism as a whole and at face value, but says that they
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simply do not produce a system of government that is 
competent to meet the challenges and tasks that every 
government must face.
In Lowi's book, The End of Liberalism, Lowi states that 
the biggest problem of a Liberal government is that it cannot 
effectively plan a strategy of administration; "Liberal 
governments cannot plan. Planning requires law, choice, 
priorities, moralities. Liberalism replaces planning with 
bargaining. Yet at bottom power is unacceptable without 
planning" (Lowi, 1969, p. 101). He intends to show by his 
examples that before complex policy issues Liberal 
governments are doomed to grope aimlessly as if in a dark 
thicket.
Lowi contends that the reason Liberal government (i.e. 
the US government) cannot plan is two-faceted. It is partly 
because the authors of Liberal philosophies all the way back 
to Locke have not given a complete "rule set" for 
establishing actual Liberal governments, and partly because 
of the rise of what he terms "interest group" approaches to 
policy questions (1969, p. 124) . In regard to the first- 
problem, Lowi seems to be frustrated in some implicit sense 
that Locke and others did not provide a detailed set of 
instructions on how to construct a functional government.
For instance, Locke did not start his second treatise, "Begin
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with a bi-cameral legislative body consisting of two senators 
taken from every state in the federal union..." He did not 
even propose specific sections of American constitution. 
Lowi, though, feels that because of the generalness of sane 
of Locke1s governmental prescriptions, and due to certain 
other precepts within the Liberal ideology, the government of 
America has developed a system of policy-making approaches 
that are ultimately a failure, economically and socially 
speaking.
He says that because of "pluralist interests" within 
Liberal society and the amount of freedom they are given 
under Liberal government to pursue their own life, liberty, 
and happiness, the Liberal American system has developed a 
mechanism of producing policy which panders to the interests 
of this large assortment of groups (1969, p. 101). This,
Lowi says, makes long-range social or economic planning 
unfeasible on a national scale, a problem that he states will 
eventually lead to the demise of Liberalism.
Interest groups develop power, according to Lowi, 
because of a process he calls delegation. Liberal 
governments appear to have some measure of flexibility in the 
first stage of a response to an issue, but this is only an 
illusion. What is really occurring is that the government 
in a Liberal society develops a bureaucratic expansion to
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deal with the problem, and this expansion is comprised of 
interest groups that are most familiar with the type of work 
to be accomplished. The appearance of government flexibility 
arises as a flurry of activity gets underway to form the 
expansion organization (Lowi, 1969, p. 101).
The problem with this system comes into play in the next 
stage of the process. The self-serving interest groups which 
have been given control to formulate policy in given areas 
soon find that there are policy matters to be dealt with in 
areas that lie partially within another group's jurisdiction. 
Since the organizations are "self-interested," they are not 
willing to ) irgain away any share of their pie to the other 
group so that a meaningful, functional policy compromise may 
be formulated to address the need. Thus Liberal government 
organizations spend most of their time and energy trying to 
unsuccessfully break interest group deadlocks on matters of 
important national policy. Lowi uses the example of 
agriculture in America to show that interest groups really 
are in control of regulating industries that operate in the 
sphereof national development, saying that it is clear that 
"This has been accomplished...by private expropriation of 
public authority* (196®, p. 102-115). He also makes direct 
reference to the enormous influence these interest groups 
exert over government, noting within his illustration of
agricultural regulation, "Rural congressmen and state 
assemblymen...are recruited by and owe their elections to the 
same forces that operate the quasi-public committees, and 
each level of activity reinforces the other" {Lowi, 1969, p. 
124). He sees the process as self-perpetuating and 
unbreakable. And that is exactly tt problem that Lowi 
describes as crippling Liberal government in America: an
idealized scheme of "cooperative" interest groups engaging in 
an unending battle for power because of constitutional 
regulations on government taken directly from the ideology of 
Liberalism.
On the surface, this challenge to Liberal forms of 
government seems very serious and threatening indeed, it is 
easy to see by the example* and statistics that Lowi offers 
that his assessment of the situation is basically correct.
But Low! is making a large mistake in assuming that this is 
an overwhelming error of Liberalism, one that will lead to 
the eventual downfall of the entire system. The reason he 
falls into this error is that he tries to redefine Liberal 
governments and what their purpose is. Lowi presents his own 
system of government in his took, one which he refers to as 
"juridicial democracy." This is really the standard that he 
is holding Liberalism to, but it is an unfair comparison.
Lowi has his ideas about the purpose of government in
SI
general; the framers of Liberalism and the American 
constitution had theirs. And their purposes are distinctly 
different from those of Lowi, and a more careful reading of 
the history of American government should make that 
abundantly clear.
When Lowi says American government cannot plan, cannot 
formulate a process wherein to assimilate all national policy 
areas under one umbrella of directive organization, he is not 
saying anything that the framers of the constitution failed 
to realize. In fact, when Lowi decries interest group 
policy-making mechanisms as an "imposition of impotence" 
(1969, p. 156), he is actually giving an enormous compliment 
to America's Liberal government and its builders. This 
deadlock of conflicting interest, this delegation of matters 
of public concern into the private sphere, this bump-and- 
grind and bargain system of churning out government policy ia 
exactly the system which the constructors of the American 
constitutional system wished to effect.
Recall Locke's writings on the matter of the separation 
of powers. He instructed in general terms that this was one 
of the most important aspects of a Liberal government, 
because of the dangers of concentrating too much power into 
one group or individual. It is from these kinds of warnings 
that the American system of policy-generation through
» v
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interest group conflicts developed. American government, and 
Liberal ones in general, are not supposed to have largely 
centralized bases of policy planning. The further away a 
Liberal system can get from a nucleus of command and the 
dangers of tyranny, the better. Policy initiatives, laws, 
and legislation are meant to be difficult, time consuming 
processes. This is the best way to distribute political 
power and sovereignty to the people--and the best way to 
insure that it stays with them. These are the stated goals 
of Liberal government from the outset.
Lowi, by criticizing Liberal governments for a lack of a 
centralized approach to public matters, has implicitly 
changed the definition of what Liberal government is all 
about. In the process, he condemned Liberal government to 
die an agonized death in the quicksand of paralysis. He went 
so far with this assessment that the title of his book is the 
funeral announcement of Liberal philosophy and government 
everywhere. Only he couldn't see that what he called 
Liberalism's mortal flaw is actually its greatest strength.
To use, somewhat smugly, an a modern example of what happens 
to governments with centralized planning schemes, one could 
point to the recently defunct Soviet Union. The power of 
Liberalism is that it allows large numbers of people to 
participate in the policy-making process, and that this takes
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enough time and effort that mistakes may be discovered before 
they are made into law. The power of Liberalism is 
distributed widely, yes, but that is what provides it a firm, 
broad base on which to stand. Liberalism has thus faced 
several pivotal conflicts and emerged a triumphant ideology.
Section 4: Conclusions
He have examined Liberalism as an ideology and the 
manner in which individuals and governments have applied it 
as a guide for action. Liberalism has proved itself over and 
over since it came into being through the political 
philosophy of John Locke centuries ago. Liberal principles 
have survived numerous challenges on the practical and 
philosophic level, always triumphing over adversaries because 
of its celebration of individuality and its dedication to 
freedom.
The study of Liberalism has proved to be of value in a 
predictive sense; we may, through understanding historical 
mechanisms of dealing with confrontations to ideology, look 
to the future and imagine the ways in which those suns 
mechanisms may be similarly applied. Or, we have merely to 
look around us at this present moment in America's Liberal 
political development to discover what challenges to 
Liberalism are now taking shape and substance, we have a 
standard, through our analysis of Liberalism, for 
interpreting ideologically driven events as they unfold.
If the past is any indication, the future is inviting 
indeed to champions of Liberal philosophy. Liberalism has 
been aptly titled in every sense: as a theory of man, it
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celebrates his intelligence through liberal distribution of 
Reaso’t to all; as a theory of property, it establishes a 
means through which common men, left to themselves, produce 
liberal amounts rf the good fruits of life which everyone may 
partake of; and as a theory of government, it gives men 
liberal freedom the tyranny of punishing, self-serving 
rulers. All its precepts taken together form a set of 
beliefs which encourages the human spirit through its 
willingness to trust it and make it free. Such an ideology 
can be praised not only for the functional benefits it 
provides, but also for the freedom it gives us in ourselves. 
That is the ideology of Liberalism; we have viewed its 
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